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but collective ordering of social relations would take a back seat.
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1. Introduction
'Citizenship' has frequently been used as a key concept in Migration Studies. It has also become 
commonplace to feature the concept in Welfare State Studies, especially in these ten years (e. g. Ferrera 
2005). Marshallian linear evolutionary view of citizenship is, however, of little help in the analysis of current
social policy development in Europe any more. What we are witnessing in Europe is the transformation of 
the meaning of 'citizenship', not only concerning a person's belonging to a certain political unit, but also in 
regard to the benefit s/he would expect from the state s/he resides in. This paper is an attempt to connect both
aspects of the transformation.
In concrete, this paper builds on Christian Joppke's hypothesis on the 'lightening of citizenship' 
(Joppke 2010a; 2010b). My initial hunch is that lightening of citizenship would have a substantial impact on 
internal aspects of citizenship, namely what a state expects from its citizenry and what it guarantees in return.
Taking recent social policy developments in Europe as an example, this paper contends that lightening of 
citizenship entails universalisation and lightening of social policy. In other words, the lightening of 
citizenship coincides with the lightening of social security. 
As this point is already suggested by Joppke, the paper highlights the roles of the EU institutions in 
this transformation. Especially, this paper features the effect of the leading role of the judiciary in the EU and
contends that the judiciary-induced policy making affects the content of the policy. 
Substantially, we argue that the universalisation and lightening of social security corresponds to 
functional requirement of the internal market in the first place, but it is also a plausible answer to the 
increasingly diversified and de-stylised life career of its citizenry. In this regard, 'lightening' should be 
conceptually separated from mere 'retrenchment' of welfare or 'neo-liberalization'. This direction has been 
augmented by the intervention of the ECJ, whose judgements has built on the Union Citizenship and 
enhanced individual social rights protection. 
This trend may be called 'rights revolution' European style, but not without price. Featuring citizenship
as a universal status, individual rights are protected, but collective ordering of social relations, which has 
been an important part of  the social rights, would take a back seat. Therefore, the paper contends that a new 
perspective of "the individual versus the collective" is relevant in the analysis of EU social and employment 
policy.
After making a brief clarification of the concepts used in the next section, we examine the 
development of  the EU social policy with an emphasis on the role of the ECJ and the Union Citizenship. 
This section illuminates the individualistic aspect and the reach of Union Citizenship. Against this 
background, we analyse four ECJ rulings and contrast this development with the 'collective ordering' aspect 
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of social rights of the Member States, taking Germany as a main example. The final section summarises our 
argument and its implication.
2. Preliminary Consideration
(1) Conceptual Clarification of ‘Citizenship’
The concept of ‘citizenship’ has been used in different connotations, depending on disciplines and 
theoretical standpoints of authors. In this paper, we use the term in rather narrow sense, in other words, 
concentrate ourselves on its legal aspect. In this understanding, citizenship is the ‘right to have rights’, the 
fundamental status of a person to have a bundle of rights normally accorded to a full member of a given 
political community. 
The reason for this definition is that we intend neither to advance theoretical arguments for a 
normative conception of a better society nor to give a tour d’horizon. Rather, our aim is to analyse concrete 
policy developments in the EU social policy, in relation to the ‘Citizenship of the Union’ now defined in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 20). It means that we treat the concept more in a 
positivist manner than as a theoretical conception. 
Focus on the legal aspect of the Union Citizenship is also justified by its nature. Considering the 
nature of the EU as a supranational polity, the nature of membership to that entity can only be a thin one. 
Thicker meaning of citizenship concerning the rights and duties of a person differs in each Member States 
(cf. Pfeifer 2009). Therefore, in the analysis of the Union Citizenship, narrow focus on the legal aspect is 
relevant. 
Further, the development of the Union Citizenship has owed much to the judgements of the ECJ. Thus,
it is only natural to put the legal aspect into the centre. This point is further explored in the next subsection.
(2) Effect of the ECJ Intervention
The second point concerns the political role of the ECJ. In the past twenty years, we have witnessed 
the growing field of interdisciplinary study on the EU norm/rule generation (for state of the art, see Conant 
2007; Stone Sweet 2010; Vauchez 2008). Political researchers have begun to pay attention to the role of the 
judiciary in the European integration process, and some legal scholars have been offering theoretical 
perspectives that touch on the central concerns of political studies, like legitimacy, democracy and so on 
(Stone Sweet 2004; Alter 2001; Weiler 1998).
Many of those works, especially those by political scholars, ask why and how the ECJ has played such
a prominent role in the norm/rule setting, in contrast to the national experiences where the legislative branch 
is the central stage of norm formulation (Stone Sweet 2004; Conant 2002; Cichowski 2007). Recently, the 
Americanisation of European legal systems has also been lively debated (e.g. European Political Science 
2008). 
The focus of this paper is, although related to those issues, different. We concentrate our focus on the 
effect of the ECJ intervention on policy content1. It is true that judiciary may have substantial policy impact, 
1 As a related argument, Mabbett (2011), who partially builds on the "rights revolution" framework of American 
judicial politics, is insightful and thought-provoking.
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but it does not mean judiciary is just another political actor.  In this regard, studies on American judicial 
politics offer a useful perspective.  Silverstein (2008) contends in general terms:
"There are instances in which language, legal forms, and legal frames shape and constrain political 
behavior [...]. The narrowing, formalizing, and hardening of the terms of debate add up to what 
might be called juridification [...]." (p. 2)
In an concrete analysis of the US social policy, he adds: 
"Although some Court rulings expanded access to welfare payments, the doctrinal frame in which 
these decisions were set limited their reach and scope." (p.108)
This point is contrasted with the German case by Abraham (2005: 9, note 24) which notes the policy effects 
of the 'Rights Revolution' in the US as follows: 
"The individualistic and individualizing, apolitical side of rights and of the 'rights revolution' in the 
U.S. has been the subject of analysis by conservatives and radicals alike... The situation in Germany 
is still quite different, notwithstanding the enlargement of individual rights there over the past 30 
years".
These authors suggest that judicialisation in the US entails a specific policy effect2. In our case, too, it 
can be hypothesized that the intervention by the ECJ tends to favour a specific policy direction, protection of 
individual rights, because the ECJ is a judicial and supranational actor, in comparison with political and 
national actors. As a judicial body, the primary task for the ECJ would be more to protect the rights of a 
person in a concrete case than to forge a collective compromise or decide on future policy direction. Further, 
rights may be argued to be more universal and common to the Member States (cf. Krebber 2006). In 
addition, it needs to secure the "four freedoms" and protect individual rights enhanced by the ECJ itself 
through expansive interpretation of the European citizenship clauses. 
‘Citizenship’ plays a great role here. As is shown below, the Union Citizenship introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty has become a powerful conceptual leverage for the ECJ to pursue a transnational answer. 
For that purpose, the meaning of the Union Citizenship should be universal and abstract. Thus the rights 
conferred on this status become individualist and universal. Then, if the individual rights protection covers 
social rights, does it suffice to the realisation of the Social Europe? In the next subsection, we elaborate on 
that topic.
(3) Liberal vs. Social and Individual vs. Collective Dichotomies
2 Tushnet (2008) argues that so-called strong-form judicial review may be less suited to the effective 
implementation of social rights than week-form review. Schiller (1999: 4-5) traces the development of American 
labour law and and argues that the 'rights revolution' helped to undermine the strength of the labour movement.
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The social dimension of the EU has been repeatedly discussed in these twenty years. It is usually 
discussed within the dichotomy of "neo-liberalism" against "social Europe", or community responsibility 
versus Member States' autonomy. These dichotomies surely capture an aspect of the issues that confront the 
European Union. 
However, they give us little guidance on several important cases. For example, it is the EU which 
introduced the anti-discrimination issue in many of the Member States (cf. Amiya-Nakada 2007). Caporaso 
and Tarrow (2009) emphasise this point. How can we understand this "social" face of the EU and its "liberal"
face like denial of national subvention or the ban on national non-tariff barriers consistently? 
Building on the argument proposed by Menedéz (2010), which contrasts individualistic rights with 
solidarity, this paper offers a new perspective to understand the political tension inherent in EU social policy.
We propose to differentiate two elements of social rights. One is the "collective order" element. This aspect 
of social and employment policy making is shared by many, if not all, of the Member States. This element 
also constitutes the "form" or the procedural characteristic of EU social policy, most prominent in the 
Articles 153–155 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). There is,  however, an 
inherent limit in this regard. In the Member States, courts can rely on historically constructed shared 
understanding on the desirable social order. To the contrary, the ECJ as a supranational actor cannot rely on a
specific understanding of "collective order", as there are different traditions among the Member States. 
The other is the "individual rights" or citizenship element, which is prominent in the content of EU 
social and employment policy. This is necessary for the well-functioning of the internal market. This element
is further enhanced by the ECJ-induced policy development. As a result, the ECJ has a built-in tendency to 
give priority to the individual elements. 
But it is potentially in contradiction with the "collective order" element in that the protection of 
individual rights may sometimes erode the solidarity foundation of the collective order. For example, 
concerning the Swedish welfare state, Trägarth and Svedberg (2013) point out "the extraordinary breadth of 
social rights" and "the equally stunning [...] lack of individual rights (p. 223)" and assert that "social rights in
Sweden have primarilly taken the form of what we call 'collective social rights' -- that is, 'rights' that are in a 
strictly juridical sense (individual, claimable, enforceable in a court of lawa) not rights at all (p.229)". 
This means that a specific configuration of policy process, namely the leading role of the judiciary, 
affects the content of the policy, which is the theoretical point of the paper.
This inherent contradiction is manifest in recent labour cases, namely the Laval, Viking, Rüffert and 
Luxembourg cases. Through the examination of the cases and responses of various political and social 
actors, this paper contends that it is not the question of whether Europe is liberal or social. Rather, the 
conflict is between the individual and the collective element of the social and employment policy. In the next
section, we first examine the individualist policy development in more detail.
3. The Effect of the ECJ Judgements and the "Citizenship Turn" of the EU Social Policy
We can find the elements of individualism and individualisation in the EU social policy. Below, we 
will substantiate this argument with several examples. The role of the ECJ is instrumental in this regard, as 
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the "right" protection of the individual is suited to transnational adjudication, especially after the "Union 
Citizenship" acquired the status of quasi-fundamental rights.
(1) Centrality of the "Four Freedoms"
In comparison with the political process in the member states, the EU policy process is characterised 
by the autonomy of each policy domain. This is due to step-by-step progress of integration and the patch-
work like distribution of competence between the EU and the Member States (cf. "Five Policy Modes" by 
Wallace 2010). Further, a political commanding height of coordination, like party government or president, is
lacking. Still, it is without doubt that construction of the common market has been the central policy concern 
throughout the integration process. In this area, the competence given to the EU is comparatively wide and 
the rule-enforcing power is rather strong. In particular, the realisation of the "four freedoms"—the free 
movement of goods, capital, services and people—is quite powerful leverage against the Member States.
It is these four freedoms that are instrumental in the expansion of the ECJ influence. The supremacy 
and the direct effect of EC law has been made possible with these freedoms as the telos of integration. EU 
law has to be prioritised because imported goods and services can be directly or indirectly disadvantaged 
without uniform interpretation of EU-wide rules.
To the contrary, social policy may have been the least integrated policy domain except foreign policy. 
The Amsterdam Treaty is the most recent major expansion of the EU competence. After the Nice revision, 
Article 3 of the treaty enlisting the community activities only indirectly touches upon social policy. In 
Chapter 11, "Social Policy", Article 137 stipulates the community competence but with strict reservation, 
saying that the "provisions adopted pursuant to this article shall not affect the right of Member States to 
define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must not significantly affect the 
financial equilibrium thereof". Further, pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose 
lock-outs are explicitly excluded from the community competence.
In short, the core of the Member States’ social security system is the least integrated policy area. This 
is because economic disparity between the Member States is directly reflected in this policy area and the 
historically accumulated "welfare regimes" are hard to integrate due to the difference in ordering principle 
and methods.
(2) Union Citizenship and the Role of the ECJ
In contrast, EU-level social policy initiatives are more prominent in the problems related to the free 
movement of the person and anti-discrimination. As the former is in close connection with the four freedoms,
EU legislation began rather early, already in 1958. The latter came to the fore in the 1990s. In both policy 
areas, the role of the ECJ has been decisive.
When the Union Citizenship clause was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, few had expected that it 
would bring about far-reaching change. It was even disappointing to some, as the original Commission idea 
of an autonomous status was rejected and the Union Citizenship was deemed "supplementary" to that of the 
Member States. 
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Unexpected influence of the Union Citizenship clause has been created by the ECJ. The landmark case
is Grzelczyk (Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR Ⅰ-6193). In this judgement, the ECJ treats Union 
citizenship as a fundamental status that can be directed against European or national regulations 
circumscribing foreign nationals' rights. In subsequent cases, the ECJ has widened the scope of application 
of the EU anti-discrimination norm from "workers" in a narrow sense to legally residing Member State 
nationals and thereby recognised the rights for social benefits. Further, the reach of the norm has been 
deepened. While non-contributory social benefits are explicitly excluded in the text of EU social security co-
ordination laws, the ECJ declared that what amounted to the "social benefit" was decided by the ECJ itself, 
not by the Member States. In effect, the ECJ has recognised recipients' claim for some non-contributory 
benefits beyond the Member States' original intention. These decisions have been justified in relation to the 
four freedoms, as the wide recognition of the social benefits claim is said to facilitate the movement of 
workers or people.
In anti-discrimination policy, the impact of the EU legislation is more direct. Soon after the 
Amsterdam Treaty took effect in May 1995, two directives, namely the Racial Equality Directive 
(2000/43/EC) and the Equal Treatment Directive (2000/78/EC), were adopted in 2000. These directives have
been referred to as "one of the most significant pieces of social legislation recently adopted by the European 
Union" (Bell 2002, 384). They are the first specific anti-discrimination legislation for many countries. 
Further, the directives instruct Member States to set up National Equality Bodies or to enable some 
associations to intervene in the litigations on behalf of the plaintiff.
It is to be noted here that these examples, social benefit rights for the foreign Member State nationals 
or anti-discrimination policy, show that EU social policy is active and visible in those policy areas where 
minimum protection of the individual's rights is at stake. Recent (soft) policy initiatives on social exclusion 
(Silver 2003) or the introduction of minimum scheme (Francesco, Haux, Matsaganis and Sutherland 2009) 
can be read in this light. 
This trend is resulting from the twin fundamental motors of EU legislation, the four freedoms and 
Union citizenship. For example, this policy direction is clearly stated in the explanation of proposal for a 
regulation on coordination of social security systems (COM (2003) 596 final):
"Coordination rules are not just intended to ensure free movement for employed persons; they
are also increasingly about protecting the social security rights of all persons moving within the 
European Union. Coordination must therefore be seen from the perspective of European citizenship 
and the building of a Social Europe." 
In other words, by securing common social minimum for the European citizen regardless of 
nationality, religion and other attributes, freedom of movement and "Social Europe" is made compatible. 
As for minimum income, the starting point is the 1992 recommendation of the council (92/441/EEC, 
24.6.1992) recommends the Member States "to recognize the basic right of a person to sufficient resources 
and social assistance to live in a manner compatible human dignity." In this recommendation, reference to 
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the 'rights' is rather declaratory, in which the emphasis is not on giving concrete subjective rights to a person 
but on the obligation of the Member States to give due consideration to that aspect.
More substantive input was made in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Spurred by the electoral success 
of the Social Democratic Parties across Europe, new policy paradigm has emerged. It is often called 'Social 
Investment' approach. This approach is distinguished from "the social protection logic of post-1945 welfare 
regimes as well as the safety-net stance of neoliberals" (Jensen 2010). The Lisbon Strategy launched in 2000 
is a part of this approach, which is also visible in the composition of the policy community surrounding the 
European Commission (Amiya-Nakada 2012).
After an initial optimism in the Lisbon Strategy had faded, future viability of the 'European Social 
Model' was discussed and more job-oriented second cycle has begun. In fear of the 'backlash', Social 
Platform, the umbrella organization of the social policy NGOs, had advocated for the strengthened role of 
the EU. Some of the headlines of its newsletter said, "[f]ocus on fundamental rights, not on models, " or 
"[i]t's all about fundamental value," which reflects their strategy to use 'rights' as leverage. 
This tendency to use the 'rights' as the main argumentative pillar continues. In response to the so-
called Social Investment Package published by the Commission this year (COM (2013) 83 final, 20.2.2013), 
European social policy NGOs stress the point again. For example, Social Platform said, "a fundamental 
rights approach is a precondition of such policies."(Social Platform 2013)  The European Anti-Poverty 
Network, one of leading European Social NGOs, also reiterates: "The SIP must confirm a rights-based 
approach and a commitment to universalism" (EAPN 2013, 7).
In this argumentation, reference to the 'rights' is not declaratory but substantial in the sense that it aims
to establish the individual's rights as justiciable, as is shown below: 
"People should be able to enforce the right to an adequate minimum income. Consideration 
should be given to the introduction of a chapter on remedies and enforcement, that guarantees the 
defense of rights to all persons [...] and that allows organizations [...] to help these persons in judicial
and administrative procedures" (EAPN 2010).
From this development, we can clearly see a typical pattern of judicialisation; once the judiciary is 
found active in a specific policy domain, societal actors try to adapt to the constellation and begin to use the 
judicial avenue as an effective tool to bypass the stagnant political route and realise their own agendas. 
Throughout this process, argumentation, strategy and objective of that societal actor will also transform to a 
certain degree.
(3) Limits of the Union Social Citizenship
Universalised minimum protection based on the Union Citizenship clause might potentially be a 
breakthrough for the reconstruction of the "social" at the EU level. In reality, the relationship with the 
existing social security system of the Member States is more of a clash rather than complementary or mutual 
reinforcement.
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A part of the reason is the liberalizing tendency inherent in EU policies. The failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty referendum in France is the most prominent example, in which not just the treaty itself 
but also the infamous "Bolkenstein" service directive (Directive 2006/123/EC) were criticised as "unsocial". 
Still, there are examples in which the EU has played a role of an innovator or a promulgator of social 
policy innovation, as in the cases of anti-discrimination or social exclusion. Even in these cases, the EU 
policy initiatives are sometimes faced with reluctance or outright opposition from the trade unions or the 
centre-left parties. For example, in the discussion of the portability of the supplementary pension, Gerd 
Andras (SPD), then the parliamentary state secretary for the German Federal Ministry of Employment and 
Social Affairs, publicly criticised the planned directive as undermining the supplementary pension scheme in 
Germany. It is to be noted that he has been the functionary of the Union of the Chemical Workers (IG 
Chemie, Papier, Keramik), which has the most developed system of supplementary pension negotiated with 
the management.
We contend that this kind of clash is due to the difference in the logic of EU social policy and the 
existing system of social and employment policy in the Member States. In other words, the clash is not just 
between the "liberal" EU and "social" Member States but also between different types of conceptions of the 
"social". As is suggested above, EU social policy has a tendency to grant the rights for minimum social 
protection to every individual. In that sense, it has the characteristic of social "citizenship" regardless of 
nationality (cf. Giubboni 2008: 3)3 . To the contrary, the social and employment protection system of each 
Member State is more than the collection of individual rights and entitlements. It is more or less the result of 
historical compromise between societal groups and political parties. This aspect is highlighted in Esping-
Andersen's seminal book, Three Worlds off Welfare Capitalism, in which welfare regimes are classified 
according to leading political groups and their inherent logic. In short, it is a kind of public order.
The rights-based nature of EU social policy (cf. Mabbett 2005) is strengthened by the leading role of 
the ECJ in policy development. The Judiciary in a given member state may find a specific type of social 
order as "their own" order and make due consideration to it even in relation to individual's fundamental 
rights. In the growing diversity of social systems and norms, the ECJ cannot afford this type of 
consideration. As the task of the ECJ is to find out common framework for all the Member States, they 
cannot rely on a specific understanding of public order. In this regard, individuals' fundamental rights are 
quite useful and powerful instruments. They are common to the Member States and can be used against 
ordinary (Member State) laws because fundamental rights are supposed to be superior (Höpner 2008). In the 
next section, we will sketch concrete examples of this kind of clash.
4. Clash of Individualised Policy and Collectivist Order: Examples of the ECJ Judgements
(1) Four ECJ Judgements in Focus
In this subsection, we analyse four recent ECJ judgements (Viking, Laval, Rüffert, and Luxembourg) 
and political reactions to them. These judgements have been perceived as a severe blow to the existing 
3 Several authors have given different expressions on the specificity of the EU social policy, as 'rights-based' 
(Mabbett 2005), 'European Social Framework' (Micklitz 2010). My formulation here tries to illuminate other 
aspects of EU social policy than those, especially its emphasis on labour policy.
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Member States' social system and invite criticism from different angles. By the analysis of the judgements 
and reactions to them, we try to illuminate the importance of this clash between individualistic social policy 
and collective order.
The background of the conflict is the Posting Directive (Directive 96/71/EC). As a matter of principle, 
free movement of persons and services makes it possible for a company to send workers to other countries 
under the working condition that only fulfils the minimum standard of the sending country, not that of the 
receiving country. As an exemption from this principle, this directive stipulates that the receiving country 
"shall ensure that... the undertakings referred to in Article 1 (1) guarantee workers posted to their territory the
terms and conditions of employment ... in the Member State where the work is carried out", as far as the core
aspects of working conditions such as maximum work periods, minimum rates of pay or provisions on non-
discrimination are concerned. The minimum condition shall be laid down "by law, regulation or 
administrative provision, and/or by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared 
universally applicable within the meaning of paragraph 8". As is easily conceivable, which Member State 
rules fall within "the terms and conditions of employment" of this directive is the source of conflict.
In Viking (C-438/05, International Transport Workers' Union Federation et al. v. Vikingline ABP et al. 
[2007] ECR I-7779), the ECJ recognised, on the one hand, the trade union's right to strike and the prevention
of social dumping as justifiable grounds for the restriction of the four freedoms. On the other hand, the Court
did not affirm the relevant action of the Finnish Trade Union and asked the referring (British) court to apply 
the proportionality principle in concrete judgement of the relevant action.
In Laval (C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet and Others [2007] 
ECR I-5751), the point was whether Swedish law implementing the directive was valid or not. The Swedish 
implementing law allowed the social partners to define the level of minimum wage, as is common to other 
rules regulating the labour market. In other words, one of the central elements of Swedish industrial relations
was at stake. The judgement denied such implementation, and striking actions of Swedish trade unions based
on this understanding were deemed illegal.
In Rüffert (C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989), the government’s 
action as a party of contract was contested. German Land government of Niedersachsen made the application
of collective agreement in that land mandatory to the company accepting a public construction order. As the 
company did not apply this to its subcontractor from Poland, the Niedersachsen sued the company. Referred 
by the German court, the ECJ answered that securing minimum working conditions through public contract 
was not acceptable as a means of setting minimum standards defined by the directive and was therefore 
illegal.
Finally, in Luxembourg (C-319/06, Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323), 
the Commission sued the government of Luxembourg for its improper implementation of the directive in 
putting unnecessary restrictions on the freedom of movement by applying the wage slide to the minimum 
wage or requiring a contact person for monitoring. The ECJ sided with the Commission, saying that 
compliance to the directive can be sufficiently monitored by the sending country and that only the minimum 
condition has to be clearly defined.
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Through these four cases, the limit of the defensive action by the labour or the government against 
service provision with low-paid workers is more precisely defined. The ECJ recognised trade union's rights 
as fundamental rights and accepted governments' justification of restriction on the risk of social dumping, at 
least as a matter of principle. Nevertheless, all those protective measures were denied their legality because 
the minimum standard has to be literally minimum and clearly defined by law or declaration of universal 
applicability, according to the ECJ.
(2) Political Reactions at the European Level
Of course, the trade unions and the left parties criticised these judgements. The European Trade Union 
Congress (ETUC) issued a declaration criticizing the judgement and advocating for adoption of the "Social 
Progress Protocol" to be attached to the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament showed its concern in the 
resolution "Challenges to collective agreements in the EU" (2008/2085[INI]).
However, the Commission did not take concrete action initially. The European Council issued the 
"Solemn Declaration on Workers' Rights, Social Policy and Other Issues" in June 2009, but did not give an 
impetus for further action.
It was the political initiative taken by the Commission President Barosso that suddenly opened a 
prospect for the change in the legal texts. One day before the investiture in the European Parliament vote for 
his second term, he had a three-hour plenary session to answer the Members of the European Parliament 
(MEP) in Strasbourg. It was said that he had secured roughly 350 seats of the 736 and tried to reach out to 
the 184 members of the Socialist and Democrats (S & D) group (Simon Taylor, "Barosso makes last pitch to 
Parliament", European Voice, 15.9.2009). In that effort, he promised revision of the Posting of Workers 
Directive:
 "I have clearly stated my attachment to the respect of fundamental social rights and to the 
principle of free movement of workers. The interpretation and the implementation of the posted 
workers Directive falls short in both respects... And let me be clear: I am committed to fighting 
social dumping in Europe, whatever form it takes." ("Passion and Responsibility: Strengthening 
Europe in a Time of Change", SPEECH/09/391, 15.9.2009) 
Still, the DG Social and Employment Affairs has been rather reluctant, given the controversial and 
delicate nature of the current directive. In the roadmap submitted for impact assessment (Legislative 
Initiative on Posting of Workers, available at <ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/ 
2011_empl_001_posting_of_workers_en.pdf>), it is suggested that a new regulation, Barosso's political 
priority, is almost impossible. In its place, the suggestion given in the Monti Report is to "[c]larify the 
implementation of the Posting of Workers Directive and strengthen dissemination of information" and 
"introduce a provision to guarantee the right to strike modelled on Art. 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2679/98 and a mechanism for the informal solutions", namely minimum legislative action with informal co-
ordination and information sharing (Monti 2010, 68-70). Currently, the solution along this line has been 
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pursued.
(3) Reactions in the Member States: Case of Germany
On the contrary, the reaction of the German public opinion had already been intense before the Rüffert
judgement. The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs organised a symposium in June 2008 titled 
"The Influence of the Judgements of the European Court of Justice on the Labour Law of the Member 
States" (BMAS 2008), inviting experts including an ECJ judge. More influential in the public discussion was
the intervention of prominent public figures. Fritz W. Scharpf, who is one of the most famous German 
researchers on the EU, published an essay with the provocative title "The Only Way is Not to Follow the 
ECJ" (Scharpf 2008) in a magazine of the German Trade Union Federation. In that article, he suggested a 
possible rejection of the doctrine of supremacy of the EU law. It was consonant with a similarly anti-ECJ 
essay, "Stop the ECJ!", by the former President Roman Herzog, although this had been made in a different 
context. In this way, the role of the ECJ was highlighted.
On the occasion of the debate on the Lisbon Treaty in the German Federal Parliament, the Left Party 
made a vocal opposition to the judgements and the Lisbon Treaty. In contrast, the Greens took a clear pro-
European stance. Jürgen Trittin, past Environment Minister of the Red-Green Coalition, said, "We need to 
make Germany Europe-compatible" and criticised the incumbent government, saying:
"[Rüffert Judgement] is not a bad judgement. Rather, it is the consequence of the failure of the
Grand Coalition. This judgement comes because the declaration of universal applicability cannot be 
issued to the collective agreement." (Deutscher Bundestag, 16. WP., 157. Sitzung, 24.4.2008) 
Social Democrats were on the defensive as a part of the government taking a "yes to the treaty but..." 
stance. After the ratification by the parliament, however, the Social Democrats revised the course and issued 
a joint motion with the trade unions urging the addition of a "social progress clause" to the treaty (Für ein 
Europa des sozialen Fortschirtts: Gemeinsames Positionspapier von SPD und DGB; Deutscher Bundestag, 
16. WP., 224. Sitzung, 28.5.2009, Plenarprotokolle, 16/224, 24712B-24717C).
German sensitivity to the judgements can be partly explained by the quasi-constitutional notion of 
Tarifautonomie, or the autonomy of the social partners. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 
reads in Article 9, Paragraph 3 as follows:
"The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions 
shall be guaranteed to every individual and to every occupation or profession. Agreements that 
restrict or seek to impair this right shall be null and void; measures directed to this end shall be 
unlawful. Measures taken pursuant to Article 12a, to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 35, to 
paragraph (4) of Article 87a, or to Article 91 may not be directed against industrial disputes engaged 
in by associations within the meaning of the first sentence of this paragraph in order to safeguard and
improve working and economic conditions."
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The Federal Constitutional Court has interpreted this text as meaning the delegation of a core domain 
of the collective agreement system itself to the social partners by the state (Löwisch 1989). In its seminal 
judgement, the Federal Constitutional Court stated, "The purpose of the collective agreements is to give an 
order to working life" (BVerfG vom 18.11.1954. BVerfGE 4, 96ff, hier 108). 
This was not only a reaction to the state regulation of industrial relations in the Nazi period but also an
expression of critical reflection on the Weimar experience, in which the autonomous conflict resolution did 
not function smoothly and the governments were often forced to resort to compulsory arbitration (cf. Nautz 
1985). Due to this historical background, the (West) German industrial relations are characterised by the 
scarce use of governmental instruments such as wage freezes. The declaration of general applicability, which
may be invoked as substitute for governmental regulation, has been issued only sporadically. In short, the 
norm of government restraint in the regulation of industrial relations and autonomous rule-making by the 
social partners was established and took root so firmly as a kind of constitution in material sense.
As the ECJ judgements were seen as a frontal assault on this quasi-constitutional norm, it is no wonder
that the German public reacted with such sensitivity. In addition, as far as the Rüffert judgement is 
concerned, a similar law in the Berlin City was already sanctioned by the Federal Constitutional Court, 
which added further fuel to the fire.
(4) The Real Stake of the Conflict
Roger Liddle, former advisor to Tony Blair, summarised Scharpf's argument as "warning that the 
European project represents a judicial entrenchment of neo-liberalism needs to be treated with the utmost 
seriousness" (Liddle 2008, 27). Although Scharpf's argument was more nuanced, the "ECJ equals neo-
liberalism" thesis can be seen elsewhere, and Scharpf himself talked of "judicial deregulation" in a later 
article (Scharpf 2010). Has the ECJ become neo-liberal?
Theoretically, it is plausible to infer neo-liberalisation from the eastern enlargement after 2004, as the 
new Member States with generally lower social security standards and looser regulations have more to gain 
from the liberalisation of the older Member States. Höpner (2009) proposed a framework to analyse political 
influence on the ECJ judgements and suggested that the nationality of the judges may influence the decision 
(see also Kelemen 2011b). In fact, among the cases shown above, judges from the new Member States 
occupied more than half of the seats in Luxembourg (LV, MT, SL against AT, IT) and Rüffert (LT, PL, RO 
against FR, NE). Viking and Laval were judged by the Grand Chamber, which included only five judges from
the new Member States after 2004 among 13 in total. If we suppose some "older" Member States, like those 
of southern Europe or the UK, are rather liberal, it might be the case that the liberalisers dominate in the 
Grand Chamber, too. 
In the EP debates, nationality is clearly discernible independent of the partisan left-right position 
(European Parliament Debates, 21.10.2010). On the one hand, an MEP from the German centre-right CDU 
said:
"We need to say a clear ‘no’ to any kind of social dumping and a clear ‘no’ to attempts to 
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create ‘letterbox companies’ intended to avoid minimum standards for pay and working conditions. 
Social principles must not be subordinated to economic freedoms."
On the other hand, a socialist MEP from Estonia supported the judgement, writing:
"Unfortunately, the desire of several Western European trade union organisations to close 
markets to the new Member States once again will not help unite Europe."
This contrast surely lends plausibility to the "liberalisation by enlargement" hypothesis.
     However, from our perspective, the four judgements can be interpreted in line with the previous 
judgements, especially those expanding social rights. In Viking, the court stated that "it is for the national 
court to determine whether the jobs or conditions of employment of that trade union’s members who are 
liable to be affected by the re-flagging of the Rosella were jeopardised or under serious threat" (paragraph 
83, emphasis added). This means that what can be protected against the four freedoms is a specific interest of
individual workers (Kocher 2008). This corresponds to a series of anti-discrimination decisions that 
protected individuals' social rights.
In Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg, the issue is almost the same: "What constitutes an enforceable 
minimum standard?" In Laval, the Swedish tradition of autonomous regulation of the social partners was 
denied. In Rüffert, an indirect way of the government procurement falls outside justifiable minimum. In 
Luxembourg, too, the blanket recognition of universally applicable collective agreements in the Luxembourg 
Law is found incompatible with the directive (paragraphs 62–69). All these indicate that the minimum 
standard must be transparent and therefore defined by a statutory law or universally applicable collective 
agreements with specific content. It is not about the substance of the minimum standard but the way the 
norm was established. 
Then, what is the source for controversy? From our viewpoint, it is an individual-right orientation and 
relative disregard for the collective order aspects in those judgements. In the above-mentioned symposium 
convened by the German government, the representative of the Swedish Trade Union expressed his concern 
as follows, which illuminates our point:
"[T]he ECJ did much more than necessary in the Laval case. Carefully developed balances in 
national industrial relations systems have been distorted. One should keep in mind that EU has 27 
different labour market models. They all reflect different balances of power between Capital and 
Labour. The ECJ will become largely unpopular as it moves delicately balanced power between the 
social partners in the Members States."
He added further:
"This [is] in contrast with the so called continental models where the States have a more 
primary role in the regulation of the labour market. It appears as if the ECJ measures the Swedish (or
-13-
Scandinavian) autonomous labour market models through a lens shaped by a continental view." 
(Speech by Claes-Mikael Jonsson, in BMAS 2008)
The criticisms made by Blanke (2008) resonate with this statement. One of his points is that the 
recognition of the right to strike by the ECJ is limited for the purpose of the protection of the workers. In his 
view, trade unions should be given a greater role than that.
In contrast, the ECJ prioritises individual rights protection and sees the state as the standard setter. In 
the words of Loïc Azoulai, who spent three years in the ECJ as Référendaire in the Cabinet of General 
Advocate Poiares Maduro:
"What is at issue, in the eyes of the court is not so much the substance of social obligations...; 
it is the way these obligations are fixed...The State alone is habilitated to define the social model 
applicable to all businesses on its territory. This condemns autonomous collective actions undertaken
to the same end." (Azoulai 2008)
In Laval, the Court characterised Swedish collective agreements as "not public in nature but ... 
designed to regulate, collectively, the provision of services" (paragraph 98). Different interpretations of the 
relationship between the "public" and the "collective" are contested here. 
(5) Relevance of "Individual Rights vs. Collective Order" Perspective
As Obermeier (2008) insists, we should not read too much in those landmark cases, as the subsequent 
fine-tuning is necessary to reach a consensus between the ECJ and the Member State courts. Then, what 
happens after Laval?
It seems that the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) tried to avoid total confrontation and 
search for a compromise. On the one hand, the FCC sent warnings to the ECJ. In its Lisbon Ruling (BVerfG, 
2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009), the FCC continues a rather watchful argument presented in the Maastricht 
Ruling, in which the EU was characterised as Staatsverbund and a limit was set to European integration. In 
this ruling too, it is repeatedly suggested that the ultimate source of legitimacy of the EU lies in the Member 
States and the expansion of EU competence is allowed as far as the constitutional identity of Germany is 
preserved (Fischer-Lescano, Joerges and Wonka 2010). 
On the other hand, concrete criteria for the judgement of constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty are 
rather lax. In fact, regarding the social dimension of the EU, the FCC stands rather conciliatory. With four 
judgements in mind, the FCC appreciates efforts of the ECJ by stressing the recognition of the trade union 
rights by the ECJ and ignoring more controversial aspects, as follows:
"The Court of Justice of the European Communities, in particular, has for some years now 
interpreted citizenship of the Union as the nucleus of European solidarity and has further developed 
it in its case law based on Article 18 in conjunction with Article 12 ECT. This line of case law 
represents the attempt to found a European social identity by promoting participation of the citizens 
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of the Union in the respective social systems of the Member States. (Paragraph 395) 
"Finally, the case law of the Court of Justice has to be taken into account, which, admittedly, 
has until most recently given rise to criticism of a ‘one-sided market orientation’ of the European 
Union but has at the same time shown a series of elements for a ‘social Europe’. In its case law, the 
Court of Justice has developed principles which strengthen the social dimension of the European 
Union.” (Paragraph 398)
Thereafter, the FCC even takes the Laval case as an example of the "protection against social dumping" and 
states: "In its decision of 11 December 2007 [Viking], the Court of Justice even established the existence of a 
European fundamental right to strike" (ibid.). Here, the ECJ looks like a guardian of the social Europe.
Further, in Mangold, where the German law on early retirement was deemed incompatible with the EU
anti-discrimination directives, this stance was maintained (BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06 vom 6.7.2010). The FCC 
tolerated the ruling of the ECJ, saying: "If the supranational integration principle is not to be endangered, 
ultra vires review must be exercised reservedly by the Federal Constitutional Court" (paragraph 66). They 
even say: 
"[T]he Court of Justice has a right to tolerance of error. It is hence not a matter for the Federal
Constitutional Court in questions of the interpretation of Union law which with a methodical 
interpretation of the statute can lead to different outcomes in the usual legal science discussion 
framework, to supplant the interpretation of the Court of Justice with an interpretation of its own." 
(Ibid.) 
It may be said that the FCC has been using the carrot and stick strategy toward the ECJ. Still, the fact 
remains that the FCC has offered ground for compromise and encouraged the ECJ to implement calibration 
in the social and labour issues. 
Then, will the ECJ make concessions by limiting the scope of the controversial judgements? Although 
any answer would be a speculation at the moment, the ECJ might be responding with comity.4 In Lufthansa 
v. Kumpan (C-109/09), an age-discrimination case, the ECJ based the ruling on Mangold, but refrained from 
precluding relevant German law, leaving the discretion on substantial points to the national court with 
request of EU-law conform interpretation. Also in Rosenbladt (C-45/09), the ECJ did not preclude the 
German law that admits automatic termination of employment contract under several conditions.
Nevertheless, our perspective illuminates one important issue in the future development. It is the 
"Tarifautonomie" problematique. The word had never been used in the ruling or the opinion of the AG until 
recently. In 2008, AG Kokott from Germany used the expression for the first time, however quite 
peripherally. From 2010, AG Trstenjak (Slovenia) began to use the word more actively. In the opinion on 
Commission v. Germany (C-271/08), she tried to persuade the Court to recognize the notion of 
Tarifautonomie as a fundamental right, arguing:
4 For an analysis of recent judicial dialogue between the ECJ and the German courts, see Mabbett (2010), 
especially pp. 4–11.
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"As I propose in this opinion, the right of collective bargaining and Tarifautonomie are to be 
seen as parts of general principles of the EU law and therefore fundamental social rights." 
(Paragraph 4)
In the ruling, the Court did not follow her argument and again prioritised European public 
procurement rule to the collective agreement. They even ignore the problematique totally, without touching 
on any point AG Trstenjak had made. Nor in Rosenbladt did the Court spend any words on AG Trstenjak's 
effort to introduce the Tarifautonomie concept.
However, she continued raising the point in another recent case (C-155/10, Williams and others). 
Further, yet another AG, Pedro Cruz Villalón (Spain), took up the point in a recent opinion (C-447/09, Prigge
u.a.).5 
It is noteworthy that that these cases were sent from the German courts, which can be interpreted as an
intentional move. The German Federal Labour Court sent three cases (C-297/10 Hennings, Prigge, and 
Williams) to the ECJ and the Hamburg Labour Court one (Rosenbladt). Further, a judge in the Federal 
Labour Court, Karin Spelge, quite openly made this point in a German journal for labour lawyers:
"[O]ur understanding of Tarifautonomie is totally foreign to the ECJ." (Spelge 2010, 222)
"Only when the court in the last instance uses this procedure [preliminary reference] more 
intensively as before, we will make the ECJ more familiar with our view, especially the 
importance of Tarifautonomie for the wage setting in the German labour market." (Ibid., 223) 
To summarise, the distance between the German FCC and the ECJ on social issues is not so great as is 
highlighted in political discussions. One of the remaining issues is the "collective order" dimension of social 
rights, most clearly exemplified in the Tarifautonomie problematique. The German courts are clearly aware 
of this point and send the relevant cases to the ECJ, where a few judges serve as their "allies" for advancing 
this point. At the moment, the ECJ continues to disregard it altogether, which may indicate relevance of our 
perspective.
5. Summary of the Argument and Implication
Let us summarise our arguments. First, the EU social policy has a specific characteristic. It aims at 
universal protection of social minimum regardless of nationality, sex or race. For this purpose, Union 
Citizenship has been quite instrumental. 
Second, in advancing this agenda, 'creative' judgements of the ECJ have played a great role. As a 
result of this judicial intervention, emphasis on individual 'rights' are strengthened. This is due to the nature 
of the ECJ as judicial and supranational body.
5 It is to be noted that these two AGs have an experience of legal study in German-speaking countries. AG 
Trstenjak earned her doctoral degree in Zurich and also studied in Vienna and Hamburg. AG Cruz Villalón spent 
two years in Freiburg for post-graduate research and was a fellow at Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin in 2001/02.
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Third, the real issue concerning recent ECJ judgements is not "liberal versus social" or "integration 
versus autonomy". The conflict is between two different aspects of social and employment policy; individual
rights protection and collective public order. We tried to demonstrate the relevance of this perspective 
through the analysis of the four ECJ judgements and subsequent political and judicial reactions. In particular,
the "Tarifautonomie" problematique is a unique finding from this perspective.
As an extension of this argument, we may speculate that self-defeating logic is inherent in EU social 
policy. The more the EU tried to enhance the social aspects of integration with the help of the ECJ, the 
further the individualisation of social policy proceeds and the less stable the collective rule-making system 
becomes6. It can be a crucial problem for the EU, as the setting up of the corporatist-policy community is 
intended to bypass Member States' resistance and to enhance democratic legitimacy of the EU. With weak a 
legitimacy basis and high hurdle of political consensus-building in the Council, the judiciary-induced 
development of EU social policy may fall victim to its own (partial) success.
*This paper draws on my earlier paper, which was presented at the 12th Biennial Conference of the 
European Union Studies Association in Boston, March 2011, the 5th General Conference of the European 
Consortium for Political Research in Reykjavik, August 2011, and the 19th International Conference of 
Europeanists in Boston, March 2012. I am grateful for the comments from Jo Shaw, R. Daniel Kelemen, 
Fritz W. Scharpf, Gerda Falkner and Stijn Smismans at the sessions.
6 Magnussen and Nilssen (2013: 241) argues that the individual's motivation to participate in collective action may
suffer as a consequence of judicialisation.
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